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U.S. competitive response to Common Market preferences 
has been surprisingly good thus far. Dollar volume continues 
to mount, and though the overall percentage share has 
weakened, the loss is less than many anticipated 
EEC Tariff Walls: ·No Ministep 
But No High Hurdle Either 
HAROLD HECK 
THE HEART of a preferential trading arrangement, 
be it a common market or a free-trade area, is simply 
this: the "ins" drop trade barriers among themselves 
while retaining them against the "outs." This sets the 
latter to worrying about the survival of market posi-
tions in the integrated area. Their best hope is that 
the trade-creating effects of the arrangement will 
offset its trade-diverting aspects. 
Trade creation occurs when wider geographic mar-
kets and reduced obstacles to commerce within a 
given region ( 1) stimulate efficiency through in-
creased competition of an acceptable type, ( 2) pro-
mote a better allocation of economic resources, ( 3) 
increase investment opportunities, and ( 4) raise eco-
nomic growth. When this happens import demand 
increases and countries outside the preference area 
end up supplying more goods to the affected region 
than formerly. At the same time the added dose · 
of efficiency streamlines the export industries of the 
trade-group area, thereby creating more selling op-
portunities outside the bloc. 
Trade diversion, on the other hand, means the 
simple replacement of one supplier, who can't hurdle 
tariff walls, by another supplier, who is safely en-
sconced inside these walls. This may mean that 
business is diverted from low-cost outside producers 
to higher-cost inside producers. For their part out-
siders hope and urge that preferential arrangements 
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remain "outward" rather than "inward" looking: in 
other words, that the possibility of harm to outsiders 
is duly considered by the bloc membership and is 
deliberately avoided. 
The leading economic union in the postwar period 
is, of course, the European Economic Community. 
And the leading outsider is naturally the United 
States. Until recently the effects of the Common 
Market on this principal outsider's sales have been 
hotly debated but highly conjectural. Now, how-
ever, statistics are available to provide factual evi-
dence of what the exporter's experience actually has 
been. 
Before and After 
. This article contrasts U.S. performance in the EEC 
market in 1965 ( in most cases the latest year for 
which figures are available) with that in a base 
period ( 1958-62 average). This base period covers 
the five years just prior to the effective "bite" of most 
EEC preferences. However, it should be recognized 
that, along with the preferential elimination of tariffs 
within the Common Market, there has been a steady 
decline in the use of nontariff trade barriers, with 
concomitant benefits to outside suppliers as well as 
those within the market. The outstanding case is the 
rather complete lifting of quantitative import restric-
tions and of rigid import licensing, which had been 
serious impediments as recently as 1962. The analysis 
of the U.S. experience is based on import statistics of 
the Common Market itself. All data are taken from 
or based on the annual EEC Analytical Tables-Import 
published by the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities. 
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Trade and Transportation at Georgetown University, 
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EEC imports from the United States during the 
period were: 
U.S. Share 
Year Value($ Million) of EEC Total 
1958-62 
average ._$3,349.0 12.29 
1963 3,395.0 12.47 
1964 5,046.7 12.09 
1965 5,687.8 11.61 
1966 6,021.0 11.22 
Of course, an overall statistic showing U.S. partici-
pation in a foreign market necessarily clouds the 
performance of individual industries or products that 
make up the total. To remedy this deficiency one 
must, figuratively, put on bifocals. This is done by 
means of a~ analysis of the 177 groups in the Stan-
dard International Trade Classification (SITC). This 
is the finest detail in which import statistics are 
reported. Since an across-the-board reduction of trade 
barriers within a customs union might be expected 
to result in a rather widespread displacement of out-
side suppliers as insiders reap the benefit of their 
competitive preferences, this analysis is based on 
group performances relative to those in the base 
period, regardless of the absolute importance of the 
individual groups. 
In each of the 177 SITC groups, some imports were 
reported by the EEC from the United States in at 
least one year since 195S. But since many of these 
are of no significance, those classifications in which 
imports did not amount to at least $1 million in any 
year since 1958 were eliminated in order to make the 
mass of data more manageable. There were 31 of 
these undersized entries, which left 146 groups with 
an annual volume of $1 million or more. 
Not Outpriced Yet 
A raw count of the groups, regardless of individual 
importance or size, discloses that in 121 there was 
an increase in dollar value in 1965 as compared with 
the base period, while in 23 there was a decrease. 
In two, the dollar total remained the same. In 70 
product groups the U.S. share of total EEC imports 
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it .dipped. Shares remained the same in two. In 69 
groups there was an increase in both dollar value and 
U.S. sl1are, while in only 22 groups was there a 
decrease in both dollar value and market share. 
This record is revealing and encouraging. It shows 
a broad and generally consistent pattern of the com-
petitive dynamism of the U.S. economy. It seems to 
demon11trAte thg,t the U.S. has not priced itself out 
of world markets-at least not out of the most com-
petitive one. It suggests that, given a chance, the 
American economy responds fairly effectively-
though it must be remembered that exporters in 74 
groups found themselves supplying less, relatively, 
than in the base period. 
As may"have been expected, U.S. business with the 
EEC is inconsequential in many SITC groups, while 
it is very important in others. The leading five groups 
in 1965 accounted for 25% of U.S. exports to the 
Common Market. The leading ten represented 40% of 
total exports. 
The relative performance of these ten is shown in 
Table 1. The U.S. seems to have held its own, compet-
itively, against EEC and/or other suppliers of corn; 
coal, coke and briquettes; oilseeds; feed for animals; 
and tobacco. These are items in whose production it 
has some natural advantages. On the other hand, it 
appears to have lost ground to EEC and/or other 
suppliers of nonelectrical machinery and appliances; 
I 
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chinery and apparatus; an<l cotton. These arc items 
in which the natural or technological advantages are 
not so great. While some of these developments may 
have been due to special circumstances that are un-
connected with normal competition-such as a large 
order in one year instead of another for aircraft-it 
may be that the majority represent the simple work-
ing out of comparative cost and speQialization advan-
tages in a changed set of circumsta~pes. A3 such, they 
may adumbrate logical shifts in the pattern of inter-
national trade. 
In order to narrow down the individual groups to 
those of consequence, a cutoff point of $10 million 
each was selected. The 85 groups whose volume was 
in this range constituted 88% of total imports from the 
U.S. in 1965. In 43 of these 85 more important groups, 
United States exporters not only held their own; they 
took a larger share of the market. The total dollar 
value of these 43 groups in 1965 was $2,328 million. 
In the other 42--with a dollar value of $2,655 million 
-American exporters lost ground, sharewise, but in 
only nine cases did both dollar value and share 
decrease. 
One is led to inquire whether the percentage losses 
suffered by the United States in the 42 groups were 
to EEC members themselves. In other words, did the 
U.S. hand over its shares to those producers that were 
favored with preferences, or were third parties in-
Table 1: Ten Leading Items Imported by EEC from U.S. in 1965 
Gain Of' LonJ,rom 1958-62 
EEC Import.I Ai,erage in haftl Supplied 
from u.s,. 196$ (In% of Total EEC Impom) 
Item, (J Milon) 
U.S. EEC 
Corn 379.9 +13.6 +11.6 
Machinery and appliances, 283.9 - 1.2 + 4.1 
other than electric 
Coal, coke and briquettes 277.9 + 1.2 - 3.6 
Oilseeds 271.1 +11.3 + 1.1 
Aircraft 228.4 - 3.8 + 9.0 
Organic chemicals 212.8 :_ 2.4 + 2.3 
Other electrical machinery 178.1 - 1.6 + 3.0 
and apparatus 
Feed for animals 152.8 +12.1 - 3.4 
Tobacco 116.8 + .5 .1 
Cotton 110.4 · -15.2 + .2 
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Table 2: Comparative U.S. and EEC Record in Selected Groups, 1965 vs. 1958-62 
Import• from U.S. Point Change in Share 
Product8 1965 U.S. Share EEC Share $Million Duty Range Loss Changel 
Wheat & meslin, unmilled $73.2 variable -2.2 14.3 
Meat, fresh, chilled or frozen 66.5 5-variable -5.4 3.4 
Barley, unmilled . 34.2 variable -15.5 23.6 
Fruit, fresh, & nuts ( not incl. oil nuts), fresh or dried 28.2 10-15 - .2 3.8 
Fruit, preserved, & fruit preparations 44.0 20-25 -4.6 2.4 
Vegetable roots & tubers 9.6 20-25 -3.3 6.1 
Crude rubber (incl. synthetic & reclaimed) 52.8 5-10 -3.1 13.7 
Cotton ll0.4 0-5 -15.2 .2 
Synthetic & regenerated ( artificial) fibers 19.1 10-15 -6.2 12.7 
I Waste materials from textile fabrics ( incl. rags) 14.6 0-5 -5.8 6.9 r 
Iron & steel scrap 33.4 0-5 -17.0 18.9 I 
' Nonferrous metal scrap 38.4 0-5 -12.2 13.5 
' 
1 Petroleum products 64.1 5-10 -2.3 14.4 
Animal oils & fats 48.9 5-10 -6.3 4.2 i: 
Organic chemicals 212.8 10-15 -2.4 2.3 I I Inorganic chemicals: Elements, oxides & halogen salts 24.9 0-5 -10,9 11.7 I Pigments, paints, varnishes & related materials 11.8 10-15 -4.9 7.4 
Medicinal & pharmaceutical products 42.2 15-20 -8.2 5.0 ! 
Plastic materials, regenerated cellulose & artificial resins 88.0 15-20 -9.6 15.9 
Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. 80.2 5-10 -6.2 12.8 
Leather 12.0 5-10 -3.9 4.5 I Textile yarn & thread 22.1 10-15 -1.3 7.6 f 
Textile fabrics, woven, other than cotton fabrics 16.0 15-20 - .3 11.3 I 
Special textile fabrics & related products 12.0 10-15 -4.5 9.2 I Pearls, precious & semiprecious stones 20.7 0-5 
- .2 2.5 [ Universals, plates & sheets of iron or steel 13.5 5-10 -5.6 6.1 
' Tubes, pipes & fittings of iron or steel 9.9 10-15 -1.4 4.8 !
Copper 136.5 0-5 -4.2 8.5 
Power generating machinery, nonelectric ll7.4 10-15 -2.0 1.3 l 
Agricultural machinery & implements 26.2 10-15 - .9 12.5 I 
Metalworking machinery 51.8 5-10 -ll.l 9.5 t Textile & leather machinery 31.4 10-15 -1.8 2.7 ! Machines for special industries lll.l 10-15 - .3 4.2 
Machinery & appliances, nonelectrical 283.9 10-15 -1.2 4.1 I 
Telecommunications apparatus 50.1 15-20 -4.0 2.2 I 
Other electrical machinery & apparatus 178.1 10-15 -1.6 3.0 I Road motor vehicles 80.1 15-20 -3.0 4.4 
Aircraft 228.4 10-15 -3.8 9.0 l l 
Clothing ( except fur clothing) 19.1 15-20 -1.5 .2 I 
l 
I' 
• I 
Scientific, medical, optical, measuring & controlling instr, I I 
& apparatus 99.6 10-15 -2.5 1.6 ! Musical instr ., sound recorders & reproducerJ & parts & l 
accessories 22.8 10-15 -2.3 -6.5 I t 
Printed matter 14.9 0-5 - .2 .2 
t Increase unless otherwise indicated 
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volved? Table 2 indicates the share points lost by the 
U.S. and picked up by the EEC. In sum, out of the 
42 groups listed, the U.S. share loss was fully captured 
by the EEC in 30 cases. It was partially captured in 
11, i.e., EEC suppliers gained, but not so much as 
U.S. suppliers lost; and the EEC loss was greater than 
that of the U.S. in one case. 
Table 3 was developed in order to determine 
whether there is a noticeable correlation between the 
ranges of duty and the U.S. position compared to that 
of the EEC supplier. The data do not suggest any 
/clear relationship between rates of duty and relative 
\ferfonnance. For ins.tance, while the U.S. lost ground 
in 23 groups on which the duty range was 10% 
through 25%, it also dropped in 16 groups with a 
duty range below 10%. And though it gained in 22 
groups with low rates of duty, it also picked up in 18 
product areas where the tariff was high. It even in-
creased its share relative to that of the EEC in quite 
a number of cases in which the duty range was 10-15 
percent and above. All of this seems to indicate that 
the preferences thus far available to them did not 
materially help EEC producers, and that factors 
other than the rate of duty are more important in 
determining the flow of trade. 
A side observation is that the true casualty in many 
cases is not the United States so much as other sup-
pliers. No attempt was made to determine which 
countries were the major losers, by product, in the 
competitive race, but perhaps some research could 
profitably be slanted in this direction as more statis-
tics become available. 
Overall, the major loser, competitively, appears to 
have been the EFT A countries as a group. Changes 
in overall share of the market captur~ by principal 
suppliers were, from year to year: 
Changes in Percent of Total EEC Import Market 
Supplied by Selected Areas and Countries 
( compared w,th preceding year) 
Year EEC EFTA U.S. UlC 
1963 +I.41 -.12 -.01 +.23 
1964 +1.28 -.58 -.38 -.30 
1965 +1.52 -.61 -.48 -.44 
1966 +1.00 -.58 -.39 -.14 
Such, in brief, are the facts. Let us review eight 
tentative conclusions based on this and related 
information. 
1. Increased demand by the EEC countries ( due 
in part to the group's very formation) has generated 
strong response by U.S. export businesses. The re-
sponse was increased sales to the EEC as reflected 
in its imports. However, part of the increase is trace-
able to price increases and to U .S.-government-aided 
exports. 
2. The U.S. competitive position in the EEC (as 
compared with all suppliers, including those within 
the EEC) has improved in not one or a few, but in 
many lines of products. The improvement was in both 
dollar value and, more surprisingly, in the share of 
Table 3: U.S. Share Increases or Decreases, According to Duty Ranges 
( Figures in table indicate number of SITC groups) 
0-5 5-10 10-lS l5-ll0 JIO-llS Variable 
A-Product Groups in which U.S. Share Decreased ( 42): 
U.S. share decreased, EEC share increased 
U.S. share decreased less than that of EEC, 
but both decreased 
B-Product Groups in which U.S. Share Increased ( 43): 
U.S. share increased, EEC share decreased 
U.S. share increased more than that of EEC 
U.S. share increased less than that of EEC 
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the EEC market captured by some U.S. exporters, 
although the overall U.S. share of the market has 
dropped. However, the 1965 results are less encour-
aging than the 1964 figures. The U.S. share in 1965 
increased in 60 groups over what it was in 1964; it 
decreased in 105, and it was the same in 12. 
3. The U.S. performance reflects good response to 
competitive opportunity, despite the preferences that 
EEC members are granting each other by the pro-
gn•ssiw t•liminntion of tnriffs nnd other internal bar-
riers to trade. With few exceptions, intra-EEC tariffs 
are only 20$ of what they were in 1957, and by mid-
1968 they will be completely eliininated. These pref-
erences mean, in many cases, an added competitive 
hurdle to be overcome by the U.S. and other non-
member exporters. On the other .hand, the removal 
of quantitative restrictions on most products gave 
U.S. exporters a previously unavailable opportunity 
to cultivate the EEC's growing market. This was no 
doubt a factor in the relatively favorable dollar-
volume showing by American exporters across the 
board after 1962. 
4. In only a few cases in which the U.S. export 
position has been captured by EEC suppliers are 
American investments in the EEC known to have 
been important. Examples are crude rubber ( which 
includes synthetic and reclaimed), synthetic and 
regenerated artificial fibers, and petroleum products. 
Quite possibly investments and/or licensing in the 
industries represented by the machinery and fabrics 
arens of the SITC played an important role in the 
pil'lurt\ but supporting dlltll are not available. On 
the other side of the ledger U.S. direct-investment 
enterprises have proved important outlets for U.S. 
exports. The Department of Commerce estimates that 
about 25% of U.S. exports ( one-third of nonagricul-
tural exports) go to subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. 
firms overseas. Obviously part of the strength of U.S. 
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export performance should be attributed to the 
enlarged flow of its direct investments in the Com-
mon Market. 
5. It remains to be seen whether the common 
agricultural policy agreed to by the EEC in 1966 will 
result in increased output of several products and in 
the exclusion of U.S. products through the variable 
import levy. Some of the products affected are so 
important, in volume, that they could noticeably. 
influence competitive performance in its entirety. 
6. The apparently encouraging U.S. trade picture 
might change materially in a short time if Common 
Market membership is enlarged, and particularly if 
any additional countries having duty-free access to 
the EEC markets can supply important industrial and 
agricultural products in one or more categories. 
7. Whether this all means that a moderate duty is 
not an effective trade barrier, or that the vastly 
enlarged EEC production capacity has not yet made 
its full force felt, or that the resiliency of the Ameri-
can economy can meet and overcome most price 
competition, given the opportunity to trade, are ques-
tions which may be clarified by subsequent special-
ized analysis. 
8. The Kennedy Round of GA TT negotiations, 
completed in June, will assure continued and increas-
ing opportunity for American exports to the EEC. 
Without the negotiations, this opportunity may not 
have existed and trade could have been impaired by 
a significant spread between the next year's zero EEC 
internal tariff and its Common External Tariff. The 
latter has now been scheduled for substantial reduc-
tion over the next five years. The opportunity has thus 
been negotiated. If U.S. business continues its highly 
competitive performance, which should prove possi-
ble unless tariff cuts are negated by an extension of 
the still substantial nontariff curbs, fears of exclusion 
may be substantially allayed. 
NOTE 
The author wishes to acknowledge the statistical assistance given him in the preparation of this 
paper by Stephen P. Farrar, a graduate student at Georgetown University. 
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